In a binary choice voting scenario, voters may have fuzzy preferences but are required to make crisp choices. In order to compare a crisp voting procedure with more general mechanisms of fuzzy preference aggregation, we first focus on the latter. We present a formulation of strategy-proofness in this setting and study its consequences. On one hand, we achieve an axiomatic recommendation of the median as the aggregation rule for fuzzy preferences. On the other hand, we present conditions under which strategic concerns imply the optimality of a crisp voting procedure and argue that there is a potential gain in the integration of the preference and choice aggregation programs -namely that an underlying fuzzy preference structure may also help inform the selection of a choice aggregation rule.
Introduction
Even in the simple referendum scenario where voters are required to make a unique binary decision, two votes cast in favor of the same alternative need not imply that the two voters are equally confident in their preference for that alternative. Due to insufficient information, insufficient effort in processing that information, or even because the complexity of the issue never allows for a clear and definite preference for either alternative, whereas a vote is a crisp choice, its underlying preference may instead be fuzzy.
Fuzzy preferences have been the object of several studies in Social Choice Theory. Instead of an exact binary preference relation between two alternatives, an agent is generally assumed to have a degree of preference which is a real number between 0 and 1. This number can have two different interpretations: for several authors such as Orlovsky [22] , Ovchinnikov [23] , Basu [6] , and Barrett et al. [5] , it represents the degree of certainty with which the preference is held, while others such as Nurmi [21] , Tanino [28] , and García-Lapresta and Llamazares [17] use it to denote the intensity of that preference. Our terminology is more coherent with the former interpretation. However, as Tanino [28] also points out, a high intensity of preference results both in and from a high degree of certainty. Our assumptions (and therefore our results) are then consistent with both interpretations.
We do, however, restrict the analysis to a world with two mutually exclusive alternatives. By doing so, we bypass the important discussion on the notion of transitivity that should be applied to this setting 1 , and instead choose to emphasize the insight that can be provided by this simple case.
Given a set of voters N = {1, 2, ..., n} , where |N| is odd, and a set of two alternatives A = {x, y}, each voter i ∈ N has a fuzzy (binary) preference relation R i : 1] . Instead of the standard interval [0, 1] , we choose to rescale the problem in order to parallel May's [19] notation and thereby allow for a more straightforward comparison with May's results.
We interpret R i (x, y) as the degree of confidence with which agent i can establish a strict preference relation between x and y. We should stress that, unlike Basu [6] , we do not view the fuzziness of an agent's preferences as a measure of irrationality. Rather, as a consequence of an acknowledged lack of information, or even due to a moral impossibility to establish a precise preference, it may be rational for a voter to be divided between the two alternatives. In this simple binary problem, when γ is the percentage degree of certainty in voter i's (strict) preference for x over y, we would then expect a consistent voter to have a 1 − γ percentage degree of certainty in the (strict) preference for y over x. Following Tanino [28] , and García-Lapresta and Llamazares [17] , we therefore introduce additional structure on R i by imposing this reciprocity requirement. In our rescaled problem, this requirement translates into R i (x, y) = −R i (y, x).
With a reciprocal R i , whenever R i (x, y) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} , it also follows that R i (y, x) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and i's preference relation is said to be crisp. R i (x, y) = 1 denotes an exact preference for x over y, R i (x, y) = −1 denotes an exact preference for y over x and R i (x, y) = 0 denotes exact indifference between the two alternatives. Ordinary preferences are then a special case of fuzzy preferences.
Whenever possible, and since reciprocity ensures that R i (x, y) includes all the relevant information on i's preferences with respect to the two alternatives, we simplify the notation and write r i ≡ R i (x, y). Let < f uzzy denote the class of all such preferences. Our simplified preference profile is r = (r i ) i∈N where r ∈ < N fuzzy .
The first problem that arises when fuzzy individual preferences are allowed is the problem of rational individual choice. In the two-alternative setting, whereas determining the crisp choice associated with a crisp preference is an uncontroversial process, the link between a fuzzy preference and a crisp choice is not as straighforward. Since we are focusing on a single binary decision, we can again follow May [19] and establish a one-to-one correspondence between the possible choice sets {x} , {y} and {x, y} and the numbers 1, −1, and 0, respectively. A choice rule therefore becomes a function C : < fuzzy → {−1, 0, 1}. This also allows for the identification of choices with the crisp preferences that would originate them, but has no impact on the main results.
We should note that, according to this formulation, each agent has the possibility of choosing 0 whenever she is unable or unwilling to choose either of the remaining options. On one hand, this enables individual choice to explicitly reflect possible indifference (namely, crisp indifference). On the other hand, given that our model of a voting situation will equate an individual choice with a vote, this allows for a choice that is akin to either abstention or blank votes. If this possibility were excluded, an agent might need to resort to a coin toss (or some other randomization device) to produce a crisp choice. Allowing for an individual choice of 0 thus means that the agent is never forced to randomize -which might involve an additional cost, however small. In any case, since we assumed that alternatives are mutually exclusive, only one of them may ultimately be selected. Therefore, it is important to point out that, instead of a one-to-one correspondence between choices and outcomes, an additional step will still be required to turn the choice of 0 into a feasible outcome.
Within the literature on rational choice with fuzzy preferences, authors such as Banerjee [1] , Barrett et al. [4] , and Basu [6] reinforce the axiomatic relevance of the choice rule introduced by -and named after -Orlovsky [22] . According to the Orlovsky rule, alternative x is chosen if R i (x, y) ≥ R i (y, x); under reciprocity, this is reduced to R i (x, y) ≥ 0. Notice that it is only possible for both alternatives to be chosen if R i (x, y) = 0. In our notation, and denoting the Orlovsky choice rule by Orl, we then have that Orl(r i ) = 1 if r i > 0, Orl(r i ) = 0 if r i = 0 and Orl(r i ) = −1 if r i < 0.
Another rule suggested by Dutta et al. [14] is, in our setting, a generalization of the Orlovsky rule: according to the M α choice rule, where α ≥ 0, alternative x is chosen if R i (x, y) ≥ −α. In our notation, we then have that
It is straightforward to check that Orl = M 0 . However, for α > 0, there is a range of values for r i that do not correspond to crisp indifference but for which the agent is not confident enough to make a decision. Other rules that have been studied in the literature include the ratio and difference rules characterized by Pattanaik and Sengupta [25] , as well as Sengupta's [27] S α rule, and several formulations suggested by Dasgupta and Deb ([10] and [11] ), based on fuzzy extensions of the concepts of R-greatest and Maximal sets. Given our simplifying assumptions, however, all these can actually be represented by the M α rule (or by a slight variation thereof 2 , that would provide no additional insight). In this paper, we therefore restrict our attention to the M α and the Orl rules, with a special focus on the latter.
A second problem, that we also address in the paper even though it does not directly involve fuzzy preferences, is the issue of aggregating individual choices or votes into a social choice through a choice aggregation rule
. In the single binary decision case, the relevance of the simple majority rule was established by May's [19] well-known characterization: it is the unique well-defined rule that is both anonymous and neutral (i.e. independent of the names of the voters, and of the names of the alternatives, respectively) and that responds positively, in a strict sense, to changes in the preferences of voters. May initially allows for ties but then, through the imposition of the Positive Responsiveness axiom, tries to avoid them as possible outcomes -so that the social choice function is generally resolute. As a consequence, voters who choose 0 are mostly ignored, and treated as dummies. This Positive Responsiveness axiom is also known as Strong Monotonicity, and its desirability is not consensual because of its strength.
In this paper, we also try to find an alternative justification for the use of the majority rule, by investigating whether the mere fact that fuzzy preferences might underlie individual choices can inform a recommendation of a choice aggregation rule.
A third problem, and the main focus of the paper, is the derivation of a social preference relation from fuzzy individual preferences. The problem can be reduced, using our notation, to finding a preference aggregation rule F : < N fuzzy → < fuzzy such that r = F (r) is the fuzzy social preference relation 3 associated with profile r. This problem has also merited recent research that led García-Lapresta/Llamazares [17] , as well as Ovchinnikov [24] , to recommend the use of quasiarithmetic means. In turn, Cholewa 
3 It is interesting to consider that even if individual preferences are crisp, the social preference may be fuzzy as a reflection of the diversity of individual preferences. [9] suggests the calculation of a weighted mean and Montero [20] , based on a concern with decisiveness, advocates the simple arithmetic mean (that Tanino [28] connects to the utilitarian view). Richardson [26] and Dutta [15] also present the latter as a possible example of a non-dictatorial aggregation function satisfying the Arrovian axioms.
A simultaneous analysis of the literature that addresses these three issues indicates that there seem to be two distinct processes of achieving a social choice in the presence of fuzzy preferences. The first process would be asking agents for crisp votes and aggregating these into a choice. The second process would be aggregating the individual preferences into a possibly fuzzy social preference and then using it to produce the choice.
The issue of whether these two processes would yield a similar outcome is suggested by García-Lapresta and Llamazares [17] . After expressing the need to compatibilize the preference aggregation process with majority decision, they also present a simple example of a possible problem that we adapt to motivate our research: let there be three agents such that r 1 = r 2 = 0.2 and r 3 = −0.7; if we ask these agents to vote and they choose according to the Orlovsky rule, their choices are (1, 1, −1); using May's majority rule, 1 is the social choice; if instead we ask agents to reveal their fuzzy preferences and then aggregate them using the simple arithmetic mean, the social preference is r = −0.1; if we also apply the Orlovsky rule to produce a choice, the final outcome is −1. Comparing the use of the majority rule applied to votes with the use of the arithmetic mean to aggregate fuzzy individual preferences and then generate a choice, it is clear that the latter would penalize people with smaller degrees of certainty. The desirability of this penalization might be questionable depending on the information-gathering and preference formation processes. However, and in the context of voting, this result is particularly worrying -it suggests that asking people for crisp decisions might lead to outcomes that would be deemed undesirable if we actually collected the information on preferences rather than simply the choices. This information loss caused by the voting process might not be negligible, thus calling for a revision of the standard mechanisms of democracy.
A first question we then need to ask is whether the choice of axioms that leads to the recommendation of quasiarithmetic means is sufficiently persuasive to merit this concern. Dubois and Koning [12] present a thorough survey of the axioms used in the literature and group them into three categories: imperative, technical and facultative. Included in the latter two classes are all the axioms of Decomposability that are required to achieve the characterizations of the mean as an optimal preference aggregation rule. Indeed, adapting García-Lapresta/Llamazares's [17] decomposability requirement to our setting, we would have that, for all r, F (r) = F (r 1, 0, ..., 0) + F (0, r 2, ..., 0) + F (0, ..., 0, r n ). This would fit the definition of a technical requirement but it is pivotal for their main result. Moreover, it allows for a significant individual influence on the social preference, and consequently on the social choice. Although some connection between individual preferences and social choice is undoubtedly desirable, the strength of the connection imposed by this axiom seems questionable.
However, a second question would be if, regardless of whether the answer to the first question is affirmative, there is a manipulation-free mechanism that would allow us to elicit all the relevant information contained in the fuzzy individual preference relations, so that the aggregation could indeed be performed.
These two questions are closely related: if an individual preference has a strong impact on the social choice, we would expect the social choice to be more vulnerable to the possibility of individual manipulation. Our paper reexamines the problem of aggregating fuzzy individual preferences by including the concern with finding manipulation-free mechanisms in the axiomatic framework. Consequently, we reach a characterization of a fuzzy preference aggregation rule that avoids axioms that impose a strong mathematical connection between the social preference and each individual preference.
In a model where fuzzy preferences are allowed, we then state the conditions under which we can ensure that the social choice that results from the voting process coincides with the outcome of fuzzy preference aggregation. We finally discuss whether it is legitimate or desirable to ask fuzzy voters for crisp votes, and argue that the integration of all the aforementioned research programs is potentially profitable.
In section 2, we present and prove the main results and in the last section, we discuss the main findings.
Results
Determining a social preference relation may be useful to derive a corresponding choice. However, the decomposition of the social choice process into preference aggregation and the subsequent production of a choice does not imply that these two steps are independent. On the contrary, if strategic concerns are to be incorporated into the axiomatic requirements for a preference aggregation rule 4 , we need to ensure two things: that there is a clear process for turning a fuzzy social preference into a choice; and not only that the agents are aware of this process but that they are also able to compare all possible outcomes.
Although a similar step would be unnecessary in the standard crisp preference framework, we start by providing a simple axiomatic recommendation of a choice rule C : < fuzzy → {−1, 0, 1} that will be associated with any given fuzzy social preference r ∈ < fuzzy .
First, we would like the choice rule not to favor either alternative and we therefore need the following axiom:
Definition 1 C satisfies Neutrality if for all r ∈ < fuzzy we have C(r) = −C(−r).
Moreover, we would like to ensure that the choice parallels, or at least does not contradict, changes in the underlying preference relation:
Both Neutrality and Monotonicity are motivated by the need to simultaneously impose as little structure as possible on the rule and guarantee that the choice reflects the preference, rather than some other factors such as chance. The same motives also suggest avoiding the use of tie-breaking rules, which in turn requires avoiding ties. Therefore, in the same vein as May's [19] concern that eventually led to the recommendation of the majority rule, we could try to ensure that the social choice process always results in a clear decision:
Definition 3 C satisfies Resoluteness if for all r ∈ < f uzzy we have C(r) ∈ {−1, 1} .
However, this axiom would impose too much structure on the choice rule by eliminating ties altogether. Neutrality alone implies that C(0) = 0 and is then incompatible with Resoluteness. This is, however, the only conflict introduced by Resoluteness with respect to the first two imperative axioms. We could then try to find a choice rule that satisfies those two axioms and a Resoluteness requirement that is weakened to avoid this conflict. We achieve the following result: Proof. Sufficiency is straightforward: the Orlovsky choice rule is neutral, monotonic and resolute except where r = 0. In order to prove necessity, we have that neutrality ensures C(0) = 0 and monotonicity then implies that C(r) ≥ 0, for r ≥ 0 and C(r) ≤ 0, for r ≤ 0. Let C satisfy the axioms but, towards a contradiction, let C 6 = Orl. Then without loss of generality there is an r 0 > 0 such that C(r 0 ) = 0. By neutrality, C(−r 0 ) = 0, and by monotonicity, C(r) = 0 for all r ∈ [−r 0 , r 0 ]. But then C is not a.e. resolute.
In addition to the axiomatic recommendations of the Orlovsky rule in settings with three or more alternatives, we present a very simple axiomatic justification for its use in the context of binary voting.
Given this choice rule, we can now turn to the second problem of incorporating strategic concerns into the axiomatic characterization of a preference aggregation rule. Conditional on the fact that, once an aggregate preference is obtained, the Orlovsky rule is used to derive a choice, we would like to ensure that the voters have no incentive to misrepresent their preferences. In order to achieve this, we need to enable voters to compare choice outcomes and to decide when manipulation is profitable.
Manipulation is profitable whenever an agent strictly prefers the outcome that would result from the announcement of a preference relation other than her own. This is, however, a concept that requires evaluating outcomes according to crisp preferences. In the presence of fuzzy preferences, we then have a new difficulty that previously established results may nevertheless help overcome. Basu [6] shows that, when agents use the Orlovsky rule, an exact choice is rationalizable in terms of a fuzzy preference ordering if and only if it is also rationalizable by an exact preference ordering. In turn, Proposition 5.1 in Dutta et al. [14] generalizes this result for the M α rule, for any α ≥ 0. This exact preference relation, that would lead to the same choices as a fuzzy preference relation associated with the choice rule M α , is then named the "base relation" associated with the choice function. Also following García-Lapresta/Llamazares [17] , and allowing α to vary across agents, we then define this ordinary binary relation of strict level α i associated with r i : xP
, and the ordinary weak preference relation associated with P
In order to determine whether agent i would have an incentive to manipulate the outcome, we thus consider the strict preference P to compare outcomes, we are saying that if agent i is confident enough to make a crisp choice, then the possibility of manipulation in order to achieve that choice is reasonable. However, if i's choice would be 0, then yI α i i x and no manipulation is expected.
Although P α i i allows agent i to compare alternatives x and y, it does not allow for a comparison of all possible outcomes of the choice rule applied to the social preference. The possible outcomes are {x} , {y} and {x, y} , rep-resented by 1, −1, and 0, respectively. Given P α i i , the comparison between 1 and −1 is straightforward. However, comparing either to the choice of 0 is not possible according to the definition of P α i i . The problem is that we allow for ties -namely, for what Barberà [2] terms "natural ties" that avoid an asymmetry of outcomes when there is symmetry of preferences. However, given the assumption that alternatives are mutually exclusive, whenever a tie occurs, the information used to determine the outcome must go beyond preferences and include, for instance, the outcome of a coin toss (Kelly [18] ).
Comparing alternative x with a tie between x and y thus requires additional structure on preferences. In a crisp framework, we could use Barberà's [2] "consistency" requirement (also Lemma 3.5 in Barberà et al. [3] ): letting P and e P respectively denote the original preference and the enlarged preference that also allows for the comparison of either alternative with a tie, xP y if and only if {x} e P {x, y} e P {y} 5 . This assumption is also in line with Kelly [18] 's comparison of sets in his analysis of manipulation.
In a fuzzy framework, though, a similar assumption on P α i i might be less consensual. If an agent would choose x according to M α i with α i > 0, it seems reasonable to have {x} be preferred to the remaining options {x, y} and {y} . However, in order to compare the latter two possibilities, we cannot look to choices. If the confidence in i 0 s preference for x over y is barely above the threshold level that is required for a choice, the possibility that the preference for a tie over {y} will not suffice to generate an actual choice should not be ruled out entirely.
Instead, we introduce the enlarged preference e P Manipulation may only involve unambiguous threats. By limiting the consideration of strict preferences to the above conditions, we would seem to be strengthening the requirements for manipulation. However, we sig-nificantly weaken them by stating that a rule is vulnerable to manipulation provided that there is at least one preference profile r = (r i ) i∈N ∈ < N fuzzy and one threshold vector α = (α i ) i∈N ∈ [0, 1)
N that leads at least one agent i ∈ N to misrepresent her preferences. Our strategic axiom of no-manipulation is then a version of strategy-proofness, adapted to this setting: regardless of the announcements made by other agents, it is optimal for each agent to announce her true preferences.
Since the condition is dependent upon the choice rule that is applied to the fuzzy social preference, and we assume that the Orlovsky rule is used, we explicitly name the axiom 'Orlovsky Strategy-Proofness'.
Definition 4 F satisfies
We are assuming not only that α is not known but also that it is not relevant for the determination of the fuzzy social preference, which is defined only as a function of fuzzy individual preferences. For any given preference profile, the social preference is then the same regardless of α. However, having α i = 0 maximizes the resoluteness of the choice rule M α i , which then coincides with the Orlovsky rule. For the same r i , it is indeed the possible use of the Orlovsky rule by the agents that makes Orlovsky Strategy-Proofness most demanding. Provided we do not want to rule out the Orlovsky rule as a possibility, we obtain a strong axiom that is not, however, impeditive. In fact, this axiom would be equally strong were we to only allow agents to choose according to the Orlovsky rule. As long as we ensure that no manipulation is possible in the world where all agents choose according to the Orlovsky rule, then we ensure that no manipulation is possible. We can therefore restrict our attention to the case where that same choice rule is applied to both individual and social preferences. That same restriction is incorporated into the definition of our next axiom (that would also allow for an equivalent formulation in the more general setting).
It is clear that the strength of Orlovsky Strategy-Proofness limits individual influence on the social choice so as to avoid manipulation of the latter. In order to study its implications, we present another axiom that also establishes limitations on the impact of individual preferences. This axiom requires that the social choice remain unchanged whenever an agent whose fuzzy preference is sufficient to generate a choice becomes fully enlightened i.e. whenever her preference is replaced by the crisp preference that would originate the same choice. Since we are assuming that the Orlovsky rule is applied to the social preference, we need only ensure that the sign of that preference does not change: It is straightforward to check that this axiom would lead the arithmetic mean not to be recommended as a preference aggregation rule. This is problematic due to the following logical connection between OEI and OSP: Although the strategic concerns lead us to focus on the case where all agents use the Orlovsky rule, the assumption that this is indeed the case 6 could provide some additional insight. Namely, assuming that voters actually use the Orlovsky rule to determine individual choices (and that the same rule is applied to the social preference), we can refer back to the question raised by the example that we adapted from García-Lapresta and Llamazares [17] . We would like to check if the social choice will be the same whether we ask agents for crisp votes and aggregate these into a choice, or whether we aggregate the individual preferences into a possibly fuzzy social preference and then use it to produce the choice.
It is worth noting that, in order to do this, we need an additional assumption: that, if we ask an agent with a fuzzy preference relation for a crisp vote, this vote coincides with the individual choice that the fuzzy preference relation would induce. The individual choice rule could then be used to derive the agent's vote as well.
Since there are no "pure" costs and benefits of voting in our model (or the net "pure" benefit of voting is 0), voting is merely an instrument. Whenever an agent has a fuzzy preference relation that would lead to the crisp choice of either alternative, she will vote for that alternative as long as that vote will lead to an increase (regardless of its magnitude) in the probability of coincidence between the social and individual choices 7 . Therefore, provided that the choice aggregation rule satisfies this requirement -which is indeed the case for all the rules we mention -, the assumption that a choice equals a vote is costless.
Letting F | {−1,0,1} N denote the restriction of F to the crisp preference subdomain, we reach the following result: (F (r 1 , ..., r i , . .., r n )) 6 = sign (F (r 1 , . .., r 0 i , ..., r n )) and Orl (F (r 1 , ..., r i , . .., r n )) 6 = Orl (F (r 1 , . .., r 0 i , ..., r n )). But then Orl(r
)) i∈N , and we reach a contradiction. Also, the necessity of ii) follows from the fact that whenever r ∈ {−1, 0, 1} N , Orl(r i ) = r i for all i ∈ N and D(Orl(r i )) i∈N = D(r). In order to prove sufficiency, let r, r 0 ∈ < N fuzzy where r 0 is such that r
Finally, by a repeated application of OEI, sign(F (r)) = sign(F (r 0 )) and Orl(F (r)) = Orl(F (r 0 )). Therefore, D(Orl(r i )) i∈N = Orl(F (r)). Figure 1 : Considering a fuzzy preference profile, and the crisp preference profile that coincides with the vector of Orlovsky choices associated with the former, it is clear that both profiles generate the same individual choices. Orlovsky Enlightenment-Invariance requires that the signs of the social preferences that result from those two profiles also coincide.
Crisp
OEI is a necessary condition for Orlovsky Strategy-Proofness and significantly limits the impact of the actual values (r i ) i∈N in the determination of a social preference (although it is not merely the ordering of the degrees of preference that matter, as Barrett et al. [5] suggest). The Proposition indicates that information will also be lost if we opt for crisp voting, but that this is the same information that would be ruled out if we instead chose to aggregate preferences according to a rule that satisfies OSP (and OEI). Given that the information loss imposed by OEI may therefore be viewed as inevitable, crisp voting may indeed be a suitable collective decision process.
However, OEI is not a sufficient condition for the coincidence of the outcomes of the two social choice processes. This suggests that an underlying fuzzy preference structure might be a useful tool for determining D as well, provided we would like the crisp voting process to reflect fuzzy preference aggregation -and not to discard any additional information. Rather than questioning the validity of a crisp voting process, a fuzzy preference aggregation approach that incorporates the concern with Strategy-Proofness may instead contribute to help crisp voting become a more precise reflexion of preferences.
We therefore proceed with an axiomatic analysis of a preference aggrega-tion rule, incorporating the concern with OEI -and with Orlovsky StrategyProofness.
In the set of axioms we consider, we would once again like the names of the alternatives to be irrelevant 8 and we impose Neutrality; however, we would also like to apply that principle to voters so we now need Anonymity as well. The issue of avoiding ties and "not leaving too much to chance" leads Barberà [2] to add positive responsiveness as a requirement of the aggregation rule. The following axioms are a reflection of our concern with this issue. The first one is a weaker Monotonicity condition that seems imperative: the requirement that there be a positive (although not strict) association between individual and social preferences. We will however see that it is implied by the remaining axioms and is therefore dropped from our characterization. Since we are trying to obtain a fuzzy aggregate preference relation from fuzzy individual preference relations, we would also need to impose conditions that concern the mathematical structure of the aggregation rule (including its scale and origin).
Fung and Fu [16] suggest an axiom of Associativity that requires that, for the three agent case, F (r 1 , F (r 2 , r 3 )) = F ((r 1 , r 2 ), r 3 ). As Dubois and Koning [12] point out, this implies that the opinion of one individual has the same weight as the opinion of a group of |N| − 1 agents, inducing a too strong veto or dictatorship power, and leading to the recommendation of a rule that is almost a counterpart of unanimity in the crisp case (and generates a resoluteness issue).
Nevertheless, Dubois and Koning [12] do call attention to the need for axioms reflecting unanimous stands. We impose unanimity axioms that are stronger than those they classify as imperative, but ours do not create a 8 In the case of two alternatives, and under reciprocity, this is equivalent to having the aggregation rule be independent of the assessment criterion i.e. if r 0 i were to represent distaste for x (where r 0 i = −r i ), we would like the social preference to reflect the same scale inversion so that the final outcome would be the same. conflict with resoluteness. The first axiom states that if we add the same λ to all individual values of r i , then the same λ should be added to F (r); the second axiom is based on a similar logic applied to scalar multiplication instead of addition.
Definition 10 (UA) F satisfies Unanimous Addition if for all pairs of profiles r, r 0 ∈ < N fuzzy for which there is a λ ∈ R such that, for all i ∈ N, r i − r
Definition 11 (USP) F satisfies Unanimous Scalar Product if for all pairs of profiles r, r 0 ∈ < N fuzzy for which there is a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all i ∈ N, r i = λr 0 i , we have F (r) = λF (r 0 ).
The additional mathematical structure that we impose on the aggregation rule stems from a concern with having the collective preference mirror collective variations in individual preferences. Still, there are consequences of these properties that may be questioned. Namely, the conjunction of neutrality with UA implies idempotence: the requirement that, for all r 0 ∈ < fuzzy , F (r 0 , r 0 , ..., r 0 , r 0 ) = r 0 . Dubois and Koning [12] claim that idempotence rules out possible reinforcement effects from individual to social preference intensities; in any case, they also admit that idempotence is an inevitable consequence of the concern with complete democracy.
Unlike other characterizations, we do not require conditions that attribute strong impact to individual preferences such as positive responsiveness or associativity. Instead, we concentrate on axioms that only involve unanimous changes and limit individual impact on the social preference by imposing OEI. We achieve the following characterization:
Theorem 4 A preference aggregation rule F satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity, Unanimous Addition, Unanimous Scalar Product and Orlovsky Enlightenment Invariance if and only if F = med.
Proof.
Step 1: If |i : r i > 0| = |i : r i < 0| , then F (r) = 0.
Assume not. Without loss of generality, let F (r) > 0. For all i ∈ N such that either xP for all i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} , and Anon ensures that F (r) = F (r dec ). Therefore, since (−r 0 ) dec = r 0 , Anon implies F (−r 0 ) = F (r 0 ) and we reach a contradiction.
Step 2: If med {r i } i∈N = c, then F (r) = c.
Assume not i.e. med {r i } i∈N = c and F (r) 6 = c. Let r 0 i = λr i − λc for all i ∈ N, where 0 < λ ≤ 1 is such that λ min i∈N {r i } − λ max {c, F (r)} ≥ −1 and λ max i∈N {r i } − λ min {c, F (r)} ≤ 1. By USP and UA, F (r 0 ) = λF (r) − λc 6 = 0.
If |i : r i > c| = |i : r i < c| , then |i : r 0 i > 0| = |i : r 0 i < 0| contradicting the result in Step 1. Therefore, if med {r i } i∈N = c and |i : r i > c| = |i : r i < c| , F (r) = c.
If |i : r i > c| 6 = |i : r i < c| , assume, without loss of generality, |i : r i > c| > |i : r i < c| . Now let ε ∈ (0, 1) be such that min i:r 0 i >0 r (min i∈N {r i } − med {r i } i∈N + 1) if med {r i } i∈N > 0 and min i∈N {r i } < med {r i } i∈N − 1
(max i∈N {r i } − med {r i } i∈N − 1) if med {r i } i∈N < 0 and max i∈N {r i } > med {r i } i∈N + 1
Remark 2 It is easy to check that F (r) = med {r i } i∈N also satisfies Monotonicity and Orlovsky Strategy-Proofness 9 .
Discussion
If voters have fuzzy preferences, there may be two distinct processes of achieving a crisp social choice. The first process consists of asking voters for crisp choices and aggregating those choices; the second consists of asking voters for their preferences, aggregating those preferences and turning the (possibly fuzzy) social preference into a crisp choice. We focus on the second process and achieve a characterization of the median as the unique fuzzy preference aggregation rule that is neutral, anonymous, Orlovsky enlightenment-invariant and satisfies unanimous addition and unanimous scalar product. The inclusion of the OEI requirement, which is a consequence of our concern with strategy-proofness, makes this characterization explicitly dependent on the subsequent application of the Orlovsky rule -and the social choice is thus obtained from individual preferences through the composition Orl • med.
Provided individual preferences are continuously distributed over the interval [−1, 1] , then absolute indifference is a 0-probability event -and so is absolute social indifference, when preferences are aggregated through the median rule. The composed social choice rule Orl • med is then resolute almost everywhere.
The median rule (coupled with the Orlovsky rule) would then survive a comparison with other fuzzy preference aggregation rules. Dubois and Koning [12] point out that Fung and Fu's [16] alternative recommendation of F (r) = med {min i∈N {r i } , 0, max i∈N {r i }}, that also satisfies OEI, involves two interrelated problems: social indifference is frequent -where social indifference is interpreted only as a 0 outcome, involving an implicit assumption that the Orlovsky rule would also be used to produce a choice; and the counterpart of the rule in a crisp setting resembles the unanimity rule. Instead, and even though our axioms ensure that unanimity is respected, our recommendation would seem to be more democratic in the sense that the likelihood of absolute indifference is limited due to a greater responsiveness to individual preferences. Moreover, we have established that the simple arithmetic mean, despite its prominence in the literature, would fail to satisfy strategy-proofness (and OEI). In turn, the median rule is such that its application to a real binary voting situation would indeed ensure that the axioms that lead to its recommendation are satisfied.
However, the importance of the axiom of Orlovsky Enlightenment-Invariance exceeds its underlying strategic motivation. The axiom states that, conditional on the Orlovsky rule being used to determine the subsequent choice, only the signs of the preferences may affect the final outcome and therefore the information on actual degrees of certainty must be ignored by the aggregation rule. Then, provided OEI holds, we can make an additional recommendation. Given that the sign of any individual preference determines the associated Orlovsky choice, if individual voters choose according to the Orlovsky rule, then crisp individual choices actually capture all the information that can be used to produce a social choice, and the "second best" may be achieved through crisp voting.
Combining the results of the Theorem and Proposition 3, asking fuzzy voters for crisp votes will not imply any additional information loss if and only if the choice aggregation rule is
Therefore, if we would like the outcome of the choice aggregation process to coincide with the outcome from the alternate process of optimal fuzzy preference aggregation (and subsequent choice), the median should also be used as the choice aggregation rule. Although the same individual choices could be rationalized by crisp preference relations (leading Dutta et al. [14] to state that there is no gain and no loss in terms of explanatory power associated with the inclusion of fuzzy preferences), the fact that fuzzy preferences may underlie those choices can then inform the recommendation of a choice aggregation rule.
This implicit recommendation of the median rule for aggregating choices would seem to introduce a conflict with May's [19] recommendation of the majority rule. However, under the same assumptions, the outcomes of both would coincide almost everywhere. In this sense, the existence of fuzzy preferences is not only compatible with a crisp voting procedure, but could indeed be a useful justification, through our axiomatic approach, for almost every choice made by the majority rule.
The mere possibility that voters have fuzzy preferences thus enriches the structure of the model, that also depends on the connection between preference and choice. Together with the incorporation of strategic concerns into the analysis, it is this structure that allows us to realize that there is a potential gain in jointly analyzing preference and choice aggregation rules. We suggest that these separate research programs should be integrated, and, in doing so, not only do we achieve a characterization of a preference aggregation rule, but we are also able to recommend a choice aggregation rule that coincides almost everywhere with May's majority rule.
We should note that the desirability of the OEI axiom does not imply that information on the alternatives is unimportant. The intrinsic value of information is a separate issue. However, towards the goal of social decisionmaking, OEI does imply that information is only important as long as the sign of an agent's preference may change -and if there were a dynamic preference formation process and we had to determine the moment where that process should end, the analysis should be based on a comparison between Figure 2 : Under the application of the median, the social preference is also crisp if individual preferences are crisp. The coincidence of the two social choice processes requires that the median be used as the choice aggregation rule as well.
the costs of delaying a decision, and the costs of having to repeat the choice process in a near future if continued information led to preference inversion.
It is nevertheless important to notice that the connection between the two aggregation programs requires both the existence of a continuous distribution of agents' preferences across the admissible interval, and the individual use of the Orlovsky rule. It is the combination of these assumptions that makes the individual choice of 0 unlikely and rules out the need for a condition that ensures that 0 votes will have a limited weight on the social choice (such as May's positive responsiveness axiom). Since actual binary voting situations often involve a significant percentage of abstention, these assumptions would seem counterfactual. We should point out, though, that we are ignoring situations where a vote for 0 might result from anything other than actual preferences over the two alternatives i.e. we are ignoring any other costs or benefits that may influence the turnout decision. This model would then be better suited to a compulsory voting scenario where a 0 vote is a blank vote 10 .
Dropping the assumption that all voters choose according to the Orlovsky rule, the social choice will indeed depend on which process is used to achieve it. When voters decide according to M α i where at least one agent i is such that α i > 0, the recommendation of the median as the preference aggregation rule according to our axioms still holds. However, if the crisp voting procedure is used instead, applying the median rule to aggregate the choices implies a non-negligible probability of having to resort to a coin toss. A concern with resoluteness would then point either to the use of May's majority rule applied to crisp voting, or to the fuzzy preference aggregation process: the former would still involve mostly ignoring 0 votes, achieving a result akin to Billot's [7] "minimal step" idea, where preferences are only considered if their absolute value exceeds the minimal step α i (and where, according to Billot [7] , "democracy is treated badly the higher the α i "); instead, using the median to aggregate preferences would give equal weight to all voters and would seem to ensure truth-telling as a dominant strategy for every agent. In this sense, allowing voters to express fuzziness could increase the resoluteness of the social choice process and help overcome abstention in the corresponding crisp voting situation.
However, a potential problem may also arise in the application of the notion of strategy-proofness to a fuzzy preference aggregation rule in a model where agents choose according to M α i . Although the median would still be strategy-proof according to our definition, we may question whether a voter i such that, for instance, r i = 0.1 and α i = 0.2 would in fact reveal her true preferences. Given that, according to our definition, xI α i i y and therefore x e I α i i y, there is a multiplicity of optimal announcements and although there is no incentive not to reveal r i , the similarly optimal announcement of 0 might be a focal point -and if this were the case, the resoluteness of Orl • med would be at stake.
An issue that might also merit additional research is the nature of α i , that determines how agent i's fuzzy preference will be projected into a crisp choice. As long as this value is merely an exogenous technological parameter, in the sense that it bears no connection with the actual preference with respect to the two alternatives, our program of looking for a fuzzy preference aggregation rule that ignores α is justified. Otherwise, an agent would be characterized by both a preference and a choice mechanism and the aggregation mechanism should try to take both into account. One way of doing that would be to allow individual choice rules to factor into the determination of the choice rule that is applied to the fuzzy social preference (and if all agents decided according to the Orlovsky rule, that could provide an additional justification for its use at the social level as well).
Unresolved issues that invite further research, and that might also benefit from experimental evidence, thus include whether agents actually use the M α i rule, whether α i varies according to the issue at stake (namely, whether fuzziness inhibits both individual choice and an individual vote towards a social choice in the same manner), and whether the potential difficulty associated with the multiplicity of optimal announcements for "indifferent" agents is valid.
Additional results might help further the understanding of the conditions under which the standard crisp voting is an optimal process of collective decision and shed more light on the potential contribution of an underlying structure of fuzzy preferences.
